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Justice McLachlin (as she was then) seemed to anticipate this state of affairs more than a decade ago in her oft quoted dissent in Cooper v Canada, 6 a case which probed the extent to which tribunals had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of their enabling legislation. The majority in Cooper held that a human rights commission lacked the authority to decide Charter questions because its purpose and structure were not aligned with the adjudication of Charter rights. McLachlin J.'s dissent not only reached the opposite conclusion, but did so expressly on the grounds that the Charter should be relevant where people's rights were determined. It included the following memorable reference:
The Charter is not some holy grail which only judicial initiates of the superior courts may touch. The Charter belongs to the people. All law and law-makers that touch the people must conform to it. Tribunals and commissions charged with deciding legal issues are no exception. Many more citizens have their rights determined by these tribunals than by the courts. If the Charter is to be meaningful to ordinary people, then it must find its expression in the decisions of these tribunals.
7
This passage was later adopted by a majority in Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Martin, where the Court reversed Cooper and confirmed that tribunals that have the power to decide any question of law will presumptively have the power to hear and adjudicate the Charter. 8 In Conway, 9 the Supreme Court extended administrative jurisdiction even further by establishing that tribunals that are competent to decide questions of law also have jurisdiction not only to consider Charter issues, but also to grant Charter remedies to the extent that those remedies are consistent with their enabling legislation. Tribunals can therefore be understood as adjudicative spaces that enjoy both full access to the Charter and a broad capacity for public engagement.
In this line of case law, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that parties could seek Charter remedies from tribunals notwithstanding the practical challenges of doing so. The Court's reticence to engage with the uneven capacity of administrative tribunals is understandable, if problematic. After all, the capacity of a tribunal or administrative decision-maker is not driven by a legislative enactment but rather executive action and can vary depending on the staffing, appointments, and resources of a particular tribunal at a particular time. That said, the capacities of a tribunal are central to the effectiveness of the Charter.
As Justice Abella observed in Tranchmontagne (a case raising similar issues to Cooper and Martin but in the context of the jurisdiction over the Human Rights Code), ensuring access to a meaningful forum for having one's rights adjudicated is a key aspect of access to justice. With respect to the Social Benefits Tribunal, she observed (in dissent):
The [Social Benefits Tribunal] is meant to be an efficient, effective, and quick process. Yet it seems to be having difficulty meeting this mandate. In 2004-2005, the SBT had a backlog of 9,042 cases and received 11,127 new appeals under the [Ontario Works Act] and the ODSPA. This Court recognized in Tétreault-Gadoury… that administrative bodies responsible for ensuring the payment of monetary benefits to eligible applicants would undoubtedly be impeded from this important and time-sensitive undertaking if they were asked to decide constitutional challenges.
Imposing Code compliance hearings on the SBT will similarly and inevitably impact its ability to assist the disabled community it was established to benefit in a timely way. It will be difficult to explain to the thousands of disabled individuals waiting for their appeals to be heard -many without any interim support -that there is any public benefit in the SBT hearing a complex, lengthy, and inevitably delaying jurisprudential issue with no precedential value. That is the real access issue in this case.
10
A similar argument, of course, could be brought to bear on the tribunal jurisdiction to apply formal Charter rights. Practical challenges may render the Charter illusory in the context of administrative justice. For example, is it likely that a self-represented party before the Social Benefits Tribunal will properly identify a Charter issue, or have the capacity to fashion submissions based on the current jurisprudence related to a particular Charter right? How realistic is it to imagine such a party responding to the Crown's section 1 evidence? Will both legally and non-legally trained adjudicators have the capacity to manage Charter evidence? While some tribunals clearly can and are providing an appropriate forum for Charter adjudication, others seem ill-suited to the kind of Charter process designed by and for the courts in Canada.
In our view, what is needed to realize the promise of the Charter in the context of administrative justice is a Charter practice that is designed by and for administrative justice. Such a sphere of practice will need to be far more pliable and adaptable than the context of the courts. Administrative decision-makers vary with respect to procedure as well as substantive and policy expertise -some are as adversarial as courts while others adopt a more activist approach to adjudication. Some involve inquisitorial processes which place the decision-maker in the position of eliciting the necessary information from the parties. Others still are discretionary or regulatory rather than adjudicative settings. Hearings may occur electronically, over the phone, in person, or in writing. Appearances before the Human Rights Tribunal may stretch into weeks of complex evidentiary testimony while some hearings before the Landlord Tenant Board take less than thirty minutes. It is important that all these diverse contexts where Charter hearings may unfold have rules designed for a particular decision-maker's context. Many tribunals across Canada already have established Rules of Practice that guide applicants in raising constitutional matters.
! !
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The Alberta Appeals Commission for Workers' Compensation Board, for instance, establishes a determined timeframe and method for raising constitutional claims:
Notice of constitutional question 3.3(1) A party who intends to raise a question of constitutional law before the Appeals Commission relating to the distribution of powers must first provide written notice of their intention to do so, at least 14 days before the scheduled hearing date, to (a) the Attorney General of Canada, (b) the Minister of Justice of Alberta and the Attorney General of Alberta, (c) the Appeals Commission, and (d) every party. (2) If the notice is not provided, the Appeals Commission must not consider the constitutional question.
Referral of constitutional question to the court 3.4(1) Even when proper notice is given under rule 3.3 [Notice of constitutional question], the Appeals Commission may, instead of deciding a constitutional question relating to the distribution of powers, direct the party giving the notice to apply to the court to have the question determined, if the Commission is of the opinion that the courts the more appropriate forum in which to decide the question.
(2) If the Appeals Commission directs a party to apply to the court, the Appeals Commission must adjourn its proceeding, as it relates to the constitutional question, until the court decides the matter The Ontario Child and Family Services Review Board's Rules of Practice outline a somewhat different approach:
Notice of Constitutional Question 35.
A party who wants to challenge the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of a legislative provision must complete a notice of constitutional question which includes: a) the name of the parties; b) the file number; c) the date, time and place of the scheduled hearing; d) the specific legislative provision that is being challenged; e) the relevant facts relied on to support the constitutional challenge; f) a summary of the legal argument to be made in support of the constitutional challenge.
36.
The party must serve a copy of the notice to the parties, to the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario and deliver the notice to the Board at least 15 days before the question is to be argued. 37.
The party must provide the original notice to the Board, together with a written statement of how and when a copy of the notice was served to the parties and to the Attorneys General.
As Freya Kristjanson has emphasized, tribunals need to consider more than just adapting their rules to the requirements and realities of Charter litigation (including, for example, the requirement to provide Notice of Constitutional Question to the Government):
Tribunals must consider the impact that the newly expanded Charter jurisdiction has on all aspects of tribunal design. Clear procedural rules, as discussed above, are merely the first step. Adjudicator education, and adaptation of existing rules to what may be significantly more complex types of Charter litigation, will be a challenge both in terms of competence and funding. Finally, these cases may be the harbinger of a new and exciting era in administrative law, fulfilling the Chief Justice's vision of a Charter that belongs to the people, applied with full force in the administrative justice system.
11
While the development of distinctive Charter rules of practice for administrative justice is in some sense a welcome response to the concern over capacity and the logistic of Charter hearings, occasions where a Charter issue is identified and argued by the parties will be rare in most tribunal settings. (1) Reconciling Administrative Law and the Charter Since the early days of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has wrestled with how to reconcile Charter and administrative law principles, particularly in the context of reviewing the 13! The Charter may justify intervention in administrative decisions in several different circumstances involving different degrees of discretion.
14 First, a law granting discretion may be unconstitutional by its very terms. For example, a law authorizing a tribunal to grant a benefit to a defined group creates a discretion which, by its very terms, might violate section 15 of the Charter if it necessarily excludes another group from the benefit based on race, religion or one of the other enumerated or analogous grounds. For example, in M v H a provision of Ontario's Family Law Act was held to be discriminatory since it granted courts the discretion to award spousal support only to heterosexual spouses and not to same-sex couples.
15
The second circumstance involves a law that grants discretion to a tribunal that is not unconstitutional on its face, but such that it might nevertheless be applied in an unconstitutional manner. For example, in Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), a law authorizing the Medical Services Commission to fund certain health services was found not to violate the Charter, but the exercise of discretion by that Commission deciding not to fund interpreters for deaf patients was found to be unconstitutional. 16 Similarly, in PHS Community Services Society, 17 a federal Minister's discretion not to provide a statutory exemption to a safe injection site that satisfied all of the factual criteria was held to violate the Charter. The Court held that "the discretion vested in the Minister of Health is not absolute: as with all exercises of discretion, the Minister's decisions must conform to the Charter."
18
In the third circumstance, a law granting wide discretionary authority without sufficient guidance as to its application or without safeguards against arbitrary conduct might violate the procedural component of section 7 of the Charter. This basis for challenging discretion was relied upon by the majority of the Supreme Court in R v Morgantaler. 19 In Morgantaler, the impugned provision was a law prohibiting abortion unless a physician determined that the life or health of a woman was endangered. The procedures that therapeutic abortion committees established in hospitals to decide whether this threshold was met in individual cases were found by the majority to lack coherence, predictability, and fairness.
Fourth, a law granting a discretion that is too vague to provide sufficient notice to those who might infringe it may violate the substantive component of s 7.
20! For example in R v Morales, the Court held that a provision granting pre-trial detention where it was justified in "the public interest" was unconstitutionally vague.
21!!
The Supreme Court's first detailed examination of the relationship between the Charter and administrative discretion was in Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson.
22! At issue in that case was a remedial discretion in the Labour Code that allowed adjudicators to resolve grievances under collective agreements.
23! The grievance in Slaight concerned an allegation of wrongful dismissal. The adjudicator found that the dismissal had been wrongful and ordered the company, first, to provide the employee with a factual reference and, second, to refrain from expressing any other views about the employee. Chief Justice Dickson for the majority chose to conduct a Charter analysis and held that neither aspect of the adjudicator's order violated the Charter. Justice Lamer dissented in part and would have resolved the dispute on administrative law grounds. However, Lamer J wrote for the Court on the issue of the proper approach to discretionary decision-making under the Charter. He identified two kinds of discretion, each of which led to different remedies:
1.
The exercise of discretion was made pursuant to legislation which confers, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to infringe a protected Charter right. --It is then necessary to subject the legislation to the test set out in s 1 by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
2.
The legislation pursuant to which the exercise of administrative discretion was made confers an imprecise discretion and does not confer, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to limit the rights guaranteed by the Charter. --It is then necessary to subject the order made to the test set out in s 1 by ascertaining whether it constitutes a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society; …
24
In the circumstances of Slaight, the Court found that the Code did not require expressly or by necessary implication that a Charter right be infringed, since the arbitrator could have remedied the wrongful dismissal through other means; and therefore the Code created an imprecise discretion that permitted a Charter right to be limited. Thus, it was the order, and not the legislation, that was subjected to Charter scrutiny. here an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (8) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, he may, by order, require the employer who dismissed him to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal"). 24 Slaight, above note 39, at para 91. 25 The majority found that, while both the positive and the negative order violated the freedom of expression under s 2(b) of the Charter, each was a reasonable limit under s 1 and therefore the orders were upheld.
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The central holding of Slaight was that no public official could be authorized by a statute to breach the Charter and therefore, all discretionary authority had to be read down to only authorize decision-making which is consistent with Charter rights and guarantees. Lamer J explained this reasoning in the following terms:
Although this court must not add anything to legislation or delete anything from it, in order to make it consistent with the Charter, there is no doubt in my mind that it should also not interpret legislation that is open to more than one interpretation so as to make it inconsistent with the Charter and hence of no force or effect. Legislation conferring an imprecise discretion must therefore be interpreted as not allowing the Charter rights to be infringed. Accordingly, an adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter and he exceeds his jurisdiction if he does so.
26
Thus, discretionary authority always comes with an implied condition, which is that it be exercised in a manner consistent with all applicable Charter rights.
The principle in Slaight was applied in subsequent cases
27 where the Court highlighted the overlapping nature of the Charter and administrative law analysis, observing that it was difficult to conceive of a case where a court would conclude that a decision was unconstitutional but nonetheless reasonable.
The Court confronted the dilemma of administrative discretion again in the context of Little Sisters Books and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice).28
At issue was the discretionary authority of customs officials to seize imported goods that met the obscenity test under section 163 of the Criminal Code. Justice Binnie, writing for the majority, characterized the administration of the Customs Act by customs officers as oppressive and dismissive of the appellants' freedom of expression. He concluded that the effect-whether intended or not-was to isolate and disparage the appellants on the basis of their sexual orientation.
The Court also held that, although the exercise of discretion by customs officers violated the Charter, the Customs Act provision authorizing this conduct did not. Following the Slaight approach, the majority of the Court characterized the discretion contained in the customs legislation as capable of being applied in a fashion consistent with the Charter. Therefore, the majority saw no basis to strike down the authority of customs officials to seize material on the grounds of obscenity. 
29
See ibid at para 204 (Justice Iacobucci, writing for himself and two other members of the Court, dissented on this point. He held that the legislation itself was unconstitutional since it did not contain sufficient safeguards against unconstitutional enforcement. For the minority, simply trusting the customs bureaucracy to improve its ! ! 9! ! Sometimes, the Court may apply a Charter and administrative law analysis to the same exercise of discretion. Suresh v Canada
30
, for example, dealt with the discretionary authority of the Minister to deport refugees in circumstances where they faced the possibility of torture.
31! Suresh challenged the Minister's deportation order on both Charter and administrative law grounds. A unanimous Court conducted both a Charter review of the enabling provision and an administrative review of the Minister's decision pursuant to that provision, eventually determining that the process by which Suresh was ordered deported violated his Charter rights.
With its decision in Multani v Commission scolaire Maruerite-Bourgeoys

32
, the Court made its first effort to develop a more comprehensive approach to the dilemma of whether a Charter or administrative law analysis should apply to administrative action. Multani involved the discretionary decision of a school board to prohibit a Sikh student from wearing his kirpan, a ceremonial dagger, to school. The student and his family challenged the decision as an infringement of his freedom of religion. The Supreme Court was unanimous in allowing the challenge and striking down the board's decision but it split six to two on whether a Charter or administrative law analysis should be applied in reaching this result.
Madame Justice Charron for the majority adopted a Charter analysis since the central issue in the case was whether or not the board's decision complied with the requirements of the Charter. 33 In contrast, Deschamps and Abella JJ for the minority argued that an administrative law analysis should be conducted instead of a Charter analysis because the instrument being assessed by the Court was an administrative decision rather than a "norm of general application" such as "a law, regulation, or other similar rule of general application."
34
The majority defined the role of administrative law solely in terms of jurisdiction and warned against allowing the fundamental values protected by the Charter to be dissolved into mere administrative law principles. 35 The majority position appears either to be unaware of or to discount the significant substantive role of administrative law in supervising the exercise of discretion and of public authority more broadly. It is difficult to reconcile the Multani majority's thin and one-dimensional view of administrative law with the robust view of administrative law animating earlier Supreme Court judgments, such as Baker.
administration of the Act was not enough, and they would have imposed a different decision-making structure to remedy the Charter breach). (1)(b) of the Immigration Act gave the Minister limited discretion to deport where: the refugee's "life or freedom would be threatened" if he or she were returned to his or her country and the Minister's belief that the refugee constituted "a danger to the security of Canada" (at para 2)). Ibid at para 2 (the majority (Charron, McLachlin CJ, Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ) held that the board's decision infringed the student's freedom of religion under s 2(a) of the Charter and that the infringement could not be justified under s 1. Justice LeBel wrote a separate opinion agreeing with the majority that a Charter analysis was appropriate but proposing that the s 1 analysis should be modified in cases involving administrative discretion, at paras 140-55). 34 Ibid at paras 103, 85 (the minority would have reviewed the board's decision on a standard of reasonableness and would have concluded that the decision was unreasonable in disregarding the student's freedom of religion). 35 Ibid at para 16 ! !
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The Court sought to synthesize the various approaches to administrative law and the Charter in Doré v Barreau du Québec. 36 In Doré, the Court reviewed the decision of a provincial law society that imposed a disciplinary penalty on a lawyer for inappropriate criticism of a judge. The Court of Appeal approached Doré as a Charter case, much like Slaight, but the Supreme Court took a different approach. Justice Abella, writing for the Court, adopted an administrative law analysis to review the Quebec Barreau's decision and asserted that there is nothing in such an approach inconsistent with strong Charter protections. This approach is set out in the following terms:
The alternative is for the Court to embrace a richer conception of administrative law, under which discretion is exercised "in light of constitutional guarantees and the values they reflect" (Multani, at para. 152, per LeBel J.). Under this approach, it is unnecessary to retreat to a s 1 Oakes analysis in order to protect Charter values. Rather, administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental values. ... These cases emphasize that administrative bodies are empowered, and indeed required, to consider Charter values within their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter values into the administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise of these decision-makers, opens "an institutional dialogue about the appropriate use and control of discretion, rather than the older command-and-control relationship" (Liston, at p. 100).
37
While the Court's decision in Doré may have the potential to infuse Charter values throughout administrative justice and to develop a more "robust" approach to administrative law principles,
38!
it remains a skeletal approach that needs to be fleshed out in the diverse contexts of administrative justice. The most important question might well be: where do Charter values come from? At first glance, this question is so straightforward as to be obvious. The source of Charter values must be the Charter itself. But this clarity quickly gives way to murk. Does every Charter right give rise to a corresponding value? Moreover, must values derive only from one or more particular rights or can they flow from underlying Charter principles that are not set out in specific rights such as human dignity? It is to this question that our analysis now turns.
2) Sources of Charter Values
According to Peter Hogg, the concept of "Charter values" existing outside or beyond the interpretation of specific Charter rights can be traced to the 1986 decision in RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery where the Supreme Court ruled that common law principles ought to be consistent with the "fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution." ! !
11! !
In Oakes, Chief Justice Dickson identified values such as the "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation for a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society" as the genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. 40 Interestingly, Dickson CJ adopted the approach 
46!
The decision in Brandt Tractor demonstrates both the symbiotic relationship between Charter values and Charter rights but does little to advance a coherent framework through which to determine when a matter is better suited to Charter rights or a Charter values approach. A possible approach to this question may be traced to how the Court approached Charter values in Baker v Canada. 47 In Baker, the Court decided that administrative decisions makers ought to use their discretion "in accordance with the principles of the rule of law…in line with general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." 48 The Court expanded on the need for decisionmakers to negotiate the rule of law, administrative law, and Charter principles by submitting that their "discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the principles of the Charter." 49! While Charter rights were raised in Baker (and fully argued), the Court chose to resolve the challenge on administrative law grounds with reference to the importance of Charter values in circumscribing the exercise of administrative discretion. [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 53 <http://scc.lexum.org/decisia-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1717/index.do>. 49 Ibid at para 56.
! !
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David Dyzenhaus argues that Baker advanced the concept of the "common law constitution."50 He sees the rule of law as the fundamental value that the Charter and the common law Constitution articulate but do not exhaust.
51! However, it is unclear whether Dyzenhaus suggests that Charter values are subsumed within the wider principles of the rule of law or the other way around. In a subsequent paragraph, he suggests that decision makers are subject to rule of law values, which are "considered to be the fundamental or constitutional values of the society."
52! At the end of the day, distinguishing Charter values from other aspects of the "common law constitution" may be a distinction with little difference. The key principle for our purposes is that Charter values should be the first recourse of an adjudicative decision-maker reviewing an exercise of discretion. Arguably, a matter should only proceed to a hearing based on a Charter right where a Charter values framework is not able to resolve the challenge at issue.
Courts and tribunals have used the passages in Baker referred to above to limit the exercise of discretion when societal and constitutional interests were at stake. For instance, the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Deloitte & Touche v Ontario (Ontario Securities Commission)
53 and the Ontario Securities Commission in Re Black 54! invoked the passages in Baker to rule that the Commission's statutorily-conferred discretion to authorize disclosure in the public interest was restricted by the Charter. The OSC in Re Black relied on Charter values in its analysis to determine the extent to which disclosure implicated the public interest.
55!
However, the requirement to consider constitutional principles created inconsistencies in applying the Charter in administrative realms. In Lalonde v Ontario, consistent with the approach the Supreme Court adopted in Baker, the OCA ruled that the Health Restructuring Commission was obligated to consider the constitutional principles of "respect for and protection of minorities" in exercising its discretion to downscale health services.
56! As the OCA notes:
If the values of an international convention not adopted in statute form by Parliament have a bearing on the validity of the exercise of ministerial discretion, it must be the case that failure to take into account a fundamental principle of the Constitution when purporting to act in the public interest renders a discretionary decision subject to judicial review 57 Ibid at para 179.
! !
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However, the Ontario Superior Court in Tremblay v. Lakeshore (Town) held that a municipality was not obliged to consider the interests of the French linguistic minority because "the case is to be determined on traditional administrative law principles rather than constitutional analysis."
58!
While the issue here may simply be semantics (the difference between a discretionary decisionmaker being "obligated" to consider constitutional principles as opposed to the failure to consider such principles giving rise to a prima facie case of unreasonableness), the outcome of a case may turn on such characterizations. In light of Doré, however, the importance of a bright line between administrative law and constitutional principles may be diminishing.
Notwithstanding this apparent ambivalence to incorporating constitutional principles within an administrative law analysis, it is apparent from the above review that the courts have recognized at least four sources for Charter values: Charter rights (e.g. expressive freedom, equality), unwritten Constitutional Principles (e.g. the rule of law and respect for minorities), principles arising from the courts' Charter analysis (e.g. human dignity, privacy); and common law constitutional principles (e.g. fairness). In each case, while the analysis may begin with constitutional sources, it is brought to life through administrative justice.
Peter Hogg, as noted above, has argued that every Charter right likely has a corresponding Charter value, although this view has not been adopted by the courts.
59! David Dyzenhaus's discussion of Charter values in Baker adopts the premise that the Charter has made more explicit the fundamental values that underlie the "common law constitution," discussed above.
60!
Charter values may also flow from the preambular language reflecting commitments to the rule of law and supremacy of God. We suggest that there may well be multiple sources for Charter values -as the Charter both extended and reflected Canada's constitutional commitments. The more difficult task, as discussed below, is deciding what is not a Charter value -and why.
While recognizing the importance of Charter values in Doré v Barreau du Quebec, the Court did not explore or elaborate upon the source of those values or their boundaries. They are simply assumed to exist and to form a knowable conceptual framework to guide discretionary decisionmaking.
61 Since the Court in Doré did not provide a definitive list of values that are to inform administrative law decisions, previous jurisprudence and tribunal decisions may be of assistance. It is to this task that we now turn. 62 While any attempt to map the terrain of Charter values must necessarily be a tentative enterprise in light of this ambiguity, we argue that clarifying the scope of Charter values is essential to ensuring their coherent and principled application in the administrative justice context. One approach to Charter values (in the sense the term was used in the context of administrative justice in Doré) is that this refers to a method of applying Charter rights. In other words, unlike the situation where a Court (or tribunal) adjudicates a Charter challenge featuring the adversarial presentation of evidence, the shifting onus of proof under s 1 and an Oakes analysis, etc, a Charter values approach obviates this formal methodology in favour of an administrative law balancing of the Charter right at issue and the statutory objectives. On this view, the scope of Charter values is simply the various rights set out in the section of the Charter. 63 In Doré, for example, the value at issue was expressive freedom, and its scope is as set out in s 2(b) of the Charter. A Charter values methodology could similarly be applied to the rights set out in s.15, s.7 and so forth. This approach has the value of clarity and transparency, but also appears to use a term "Charter values" that has been deployed to convey something different than simply the text of the Charter rights themselves. When the Court refers to the importance of Charter values in interpreting and developing the common law, for example, the Court has indicated such values included "human dignity" and the "values enshrined in the Charter." Below, we set out a non-exhaustive list of the Charter values which have been variously mentioned or elaborated by Courts, some of which parallel specific Charter rights, and some of which go beyond the specific text of the Charter. The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental personal importance… Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to approve the personal decisions made by its citizens; it does, however, require the state to respect them.
66
While Justice Wilson's view of liberty did not attract majority support in Morgantaler, similar formulations have been adopted by the Court in discussing the value of liberty in subsequent cases, particularly as part of the section 1 justification analysis.
In Wilson Colony, the Court considered whether a religious community's freedom of religion was infringed by a requirement that photos accompany an application for a driver's license. 67 The Chief Justice, as noted above, recognized that in determining whether an infringement is justified, the Court should consider not just Charter rights but the values underlying those rights, of which the most important is "liberty." Because the incidental effect of the photo requirement for driver's licenses was not to preclude religious practice but rather to impose a cost on religious practice (where transportation options other than driving would have to be pursued), it constituted a reasonable limit. Had the incidental impact been to preclude the practice of a While the Court's recourse to values such as liberty as part of the section 1 analysis has been incorporated into the Oakes framework of analysis, it remains to be worked out how such values will inform the balancing envisioned in Doré, At a minimum, the Court's examination of the Charter value of liberty suggests these values will be treated as a spectrum rather than an absolute point or bright line for purposes of such balancing. This is particularly relevant for administrative justice where nearly every statutory tribunal or regulatory agency includes within its mandate the adjudication of state interference in the freedom of people to pursue their own choices.
Human Dignity
The value of human dignity is invoked often in Charter jurisprudence but rarely explored. 68 As noted above in Justice Wilson's reasons in Morgantaler, it is described as a value informing nearly all Charter rights. Additionally, it is referred to as a Charter value in Hill v Church of Scientology.
69 While examining the value of freedom of expression, discussed below, Cory J submits that "the good reputation of the individual represents and reflects the innate dignity of the individual, a concept which underlies all the Charter rights." 70! That said, Cory J. was also careful to emphasize that the application of Charter values to such as human dignity to common law rules is not the same as expanding the application of the Charter itself to all private action, and in so doing attempted the distinguish Charter rights from Charter values. Cory J. explained:
The most that the private litigant can do is argue that the common law is inconsistent with Charter values. It is very important to draw this distinction between Charter rights and Charter values. Care must be taken not to expand the application of the Charter beyond that established by s. 32(1), either by creating new causes of action, or by subjecting all court orders to Charter scrutiny. Therefore, in the context of civil litigation involving only private parties, the Charter will "apply" to the common law only to the extent that the common law is found to be inconsistent with Charter values. 71 We believe a similar approach underlies Doré. Human dignity has arisen not just in the expressive context but in a variety of other Charter settings.! Where an exercise of discretion appears to undermine this value, should this be included within the scope of Charter values to which an administrative decision-maker ought to consider?! Pearl Eliadis, for example, has argued that cases concerning poverty law should be informed by the "Charter-inspired value" of human dignity.
72
If human dignity is within the scope of Charter values, then Charter values may become overbroad, inchoate and difficult to apply coherently. If human dignity lies outside the scope of Charter values, however, then a two tier approach to the Charter may develop, with Courts pursuing a broad approach to the term while administrative adjudicators would be limited to a narrow approach. Given that what is at issue in the application of Charter values in administrative justice is an administrative law balancing, not a specific invalidation of any government action, then we would suggest the broader approach is more appropriate. Subject to judicial review on reasonableness grounds as envisioned in Doré, it should be for administrative decision-makers and adjudicators to determine the range of Charter values which have application in the context of their specialized context. Yet, the open-ended and unchartered nature of such a value raises important concerns. How will parties and their advocates anticipate the ways in which a value as diffuse as "human dignity" might factor into the decision-making process? Will it mean something similar in a social benefits context as a prison or hospital context? Operationalizing values such as human dignity poses far more challenging dilemmas than recognizing those values, as we explore further in the final section of this study.
Equality
Equality is a value that has underpinned decisions dealing with a variety of Charter rights, and also is set out as a specific guarantee in s.15 of the Charter. The extensive reference to the equality value lends support to Angela Cameron and Paul Daly's view that it constitutes a fundamental principle of the constitution, akin to those unwritten constitutional principles elaborated in the Secession Reference.
73! In other words, the Charter value of equality goes well beyond the specific elaboration of the equality right under s.15. For example, Peter Hogg outlines several cases concerning freedom of association, the right to vote, and principles of fundamental justice that are premised on the value of equality.
74
The equality value has been used in common law settings as well. In MacCabe v Board of Education, for example, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled that the common law guiding tort remedies should try to be consistent with Charter values, which includes "equality." Equality also has been referenced in administrative justice settings. In Ismail v British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), for example, the BC Superior Court employed a Doré analysis to balance the values of equality and free expression. Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to above, then the rule ought to be changed. The common law rule making an irreconcilably separated spouse an incompetent witness for the prosecution against the other spouse is inconsistent with the values in the Charter. Subject to consideration of the limits on the judicial role, the rule ought therefore to be changed. Society can have no interest in preserving marital harmony where spouses are irreconcilably separated because there is no marital harmony to be preserved.
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Mayo Moran has used Salituro to explain the importance of Charter values as a guide to the interpretation and application of the common law. For example, in addition to Iacobucci's concerns over autonomy, the common law rule was premised on an anachronistic view of women and an exaggerated emphasis placed on the promotion of marital harmony. 78 In this respect, the common law rule clashed with the equality values enshrined in the Charter. 79 Moran uses this example to stress the need to look beyond specific guarantees in the Charter when interpreting the common law, in favour of a reading that is in accordance with the "basic underlying theory of the Charter".
80 From this standpoint, autonomy and equality values speak to the broader, more fundamental values of the Charter; it is against these underlying values that the common law develops.
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This connection is not unique to autonomy and equality. While specific Charter rights are distinct, many Charter values should be seen as mutually reinforcing and interlocking. This adds both the coherence of Charter values in administrative justice, but also to their complexity and variability. 
Fairness
In addition to the Charter values expressed above, numerous courts and commentators have noted values stemming from common law rules concerning process. The Charter value of fairness is particularly applicable to the sphere of administrative justice, where procedural fairness has universal relevance.
Robert Currie notes that the Charter values of procedural fairness and a fair trial, embodied within sections 7 and 11(d), inform the common law rules of evidence.
82! Currie goes on to demonstrate that other common law rules of defence, such as confession rules and the ability to make a full answer of defense, have been "constitutionalized" through their intersection with "Charter standards."
83! Kent Roach expands upon this point by demonstrating that the common law rules relating to admissibility of evidence were modified in R v Seaboyer in order to be consistent with Charter values.
84 He notes that other common law presumptions such as fairness and respect for international commitments to human rights reflect Charter values, whereas common law presumptions such as the right to property have lost their resonance in the Charter era.
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The decisions in Hennessy v Horse Racing Alberta and Gonzalez v Alberta Driver Control Board affirm Roach and Currie's findings that procedural fairness and common law rules of evidence arguably are informed by Charter values as well. 86 In Hennessy, the Queen's Bench reviewed an appeal from the Tribunal of Horse Racing Alberta. The court found that the claimant was denied procedural fairness and fundamental justice because he was unable to make a full answer and defence, which the court considered a Charter value.
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Finally, the Quebec Court of Appeal recently described "natural justice" as a Charter value emanating from s 7 of the Charter. In Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs de ADF -CSN v Syndicat des employés de Au Dragon Forgé Inc, the Quebec Court of Appeal applied Doré to balance the objective of a law that sought to maintain confidentiality in disciplinary boards with the value of natural justice. 96 In these cases, the Tribunal used reference to Charter value of expressive freedom as a tool in interpreting the Code.
Most significantly, of course, expressive freedom was at issue in the Doré decision itself. Abella J. recognized that, "in dealing with the appropriate boundaries of civility, the severity of the conduct must be interpreted in light of the expressive rights guaranteed by the Charter, and, in particular, the public benefit in ensuring the right of lawyers to express themselves about the justice system in general and judges in particular." 97 The Court concluded that in light of the egregious content and tone of the lawyer's complaint about the Judge, the Court's balancing of expressive freedom with the statutory objectives of the Barreau's Code of Ethics "cannot be said to represent an unreasonable balance..."
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Privacy
Privacy represents yet another Charter value which is likely to find application in administrative justice contexts and which exists outside of the context of a specific Charter right. In M. (A.) v. Ryan, 99 the Supreme Court employs Charter values to extend the scope of common law privilege to reflect changing "social and legal realities of our time," and in particular the privacy of victims of sexual violence who seek psychiatric counselling. 100 In Gore v College of Physicians & Surgeons (Ontario), for example, the appellant physicians disputed an investigation by the Registrar of the College of Physicians and Surgeons pursuant to the Regulated Health Professions Act. The appellants argued that the regulation (and presumably, decisions made pursuant to the regulation) should be interpreted in light of the Charter values of protection of patient privacy and protection against self-incrimination. The court ultimately chose not to invoke Charter values in deciding the case since the regulation was not ambiguous and a Charter values approach was thus unnecessary.
101! However, the court neither confirmed nor disputed the existence of the Charter values raised.
Conclusion
The list above is not exhaustive, and should be seen as dynamic rather than static aspect of the Charter's application to administrative justice. We recognize that the scope of Charter values set out above is a somewhat subjective account of an ill-defined category. Other possible Charter values could be added, including, for example, mobility, mentioned in the context of Khadr v Canada. In that case, the Federal Court [FC] reviewed the Government's decision to refuse Omar Khadr's request for a passport. The FC ruled that the "right to leave Canada is a sufficiently important aspect of an individual's freedom" and constituted a Charter value. 102 The Court also argued that the issuance of a passport reflects the Charter value expressed by mobility rights.
103! We viewed this value as simply overlapping the mobility right as opposed to a distinct value that could constrain discretion or guide statutory interpretation. 106 and invoked as a Charter value in Wilson Colony as set out above. While mobility is arguably too narrow to constitute a Charter value, multiculturalism and the enhancement of democracy may be overly broad to fulfill this function. Alternatively, it may be that values such as mobility and multiculturalism are still inchoate and through further refinement and development may be recognized as within the scope of Charter values delineated above.
!
Notwithstanding its tentative nature, we believe the scope of Charter values discussed above in Charter jurisprudence represents an important point of departure for the development of Charter values for administrative justice. While Charter values may be seen as limited simply to the text of Charter rights differently applied in administrative justice settings, this does not appear to be how the courts themselves have conceived of Charter values, nor would such a formalist approach be in keeping with the robust and adaptive administrative law framework invoked in Doré. That said, many of the values set out lack an important contextual dimension.
Administrative justice, unlike courts, must also take into consideration the policy mandate of a particular decision-making body and the purposive nature of statutory or prerogative authority. As the Supreme Court recognized in the context of Charter remedies in Conway, while a court may do anything that is "just and appropriate" pursuant to section 24(1) remedies, a tribunal could only remedy Charter breaches by recourse to their statutorily mandated powers. The Charter cannot, in other words, be used by a tribunal to frustrate or usurp the role of the legislature in demarcating the boundaries of that tribunal's authority or its reasons for being. A similar conceptual framework, we suggest, applies in the context of Charter values. While the Charter jurisprudence can shed light on the scope of Charter values, it remains for each tribunal to determine which Charter values will be relevant to its mandate, and how to balance those values against its policy mandate. For example, while personal autonomy may be a broadly recognized Charter value, it will necessarily mean something different in the context of a 
